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Hosely: Constitutional Law: An End to Privacy in the Curtilage

CASE COMMENTS

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: AN END TO
PRIVACY IN THE CURTILAGE
Sarantopoulosv. Florida,629 So. 2d 121 (Fla. 1993)
Frank D. Hosley* **

Petitioner was arrested and charged with possessing and manufacturing
marijuana seized at his residence.' Acting on an anonymous tip,2 police
officers went to petitioner's residence where their view of the backyard
was obstructed by a six foot high wooden fence. 3 In an attempt to see
over the fence, the officers proceeded onto adjacent private property without permission.4 One officer testified that he was able to see over the
fence 5 and observed marijuana growing in the petitioner's yard, at which
time a search warrant was obtained.6 The trial court granted the
petitioner's motion to suppress the evidence seized on the grounds that the
officers violated the petitioner's reasonable expectation of privacy.7 On
appeal, the Florida Second District Court of Appeal reversed, but certified
a conflict with the Fourth District Court of Appeal to the Florida Supreme
* Editor's Note: This case comment received the George W. Milam Outstanding Case Com-

ment Award for Spring 1994.
** To Keire Rice and my parents Frank and Margaret Hosley.
1. Sarantopoulos v. State, 629 So. 2d 121, 122 (Fla. 1993). Petitioner was also charged with
possession of diazepam. Id.
2. Id. The police received information that the petitioner had marijuana in his home and growing in his backyard. Id.
3. Id. The fence surrounding the backyard was board-on-board and could not be seen through.
Id.
4. Id. The adjacent property was the neighbor's yard and not an uninhabited open field.'See
State v.Sarantopoulos, 604 So. 2d 551, 552, 555 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992).
5. Sarantopoulos, 604 So. 2d at 552. The 6'2" officer's statement that he could see over the
fence by standing on the tips of his toes was apparently accepted by the trial court, even though the
6'1" neighbor testified that he had to stand on the lower railing of the fence to see over it,
and the
6'0" petitioner stated that he needed assistance to see over the fence. Id. at 552 n.l.
6. Sarantopoulos, 629 So. 2d at 122. The search warrant was based on the anonymous tip and
the officer's observations. Id.
7. Sarantopoulos, 604 So. 2d at 552-53. The trial court found "law enforcement engaged in
'extraordinary efforts,' " violating the petitioner's reasonable expectation of privacy. Id. at 553 (citing
West v. State, 588 So. 2d 248, 249-50 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991) (holding that a police officer entering
adjoining property with permission and climbing a ladder to see over defendant's wooden fence committed an unreasonable search because his actions constituted an extraordinary effort to overcome
reasonable attempts at privacy).
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Court for a determination of the reasonableness of the search.' The Florida Supreme Court affirmed, and HELD, that although petitioner may have
an expectation of privacy under article I, section 12 of the Constitution of
the State of Florida,9 society is not prepared to recognize his expectation
as reasonable."
Historically, the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution" required surveillance by physical trespass and the seizure of tangible personal property by law enforcement officers for a search and seizure
to be unreasonable.12 However, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
changed abruptly in the United States Supreme Court decision of Katz v.
United States.t" In Katz, the Court confronted the issue of whether warrantless 4 electronic surveillance and recording of a telephone conversation by the government constitutes a search and seizure under the Fourth
Amendment. 5 Based in part on the government's evidence of telephone
conversations recorded by FBI agents through a wire tapping operation,
the petitioner had been convicted for transmitting wagering information.' 6
In reversing the petitioner's conviction, the Court found that a person
who uses a telephone booth, shutting the door behind him, assumes his
telephone conversation will be private. 7 Accordingly, the government's
surveillance violated the privacy upon which the petitioner justifiably

8. Id. at 554. The Florida Second District Court of Appeal certified conflict with West v. State.
588 So. 2d 248 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991) and with State v. Parker, 399 So. 2d 24 (3d DCA) (finding an
unreasonable search occurred where police officers on adjoining land looked in a backyard to locate a
handgun), rev. denied, 408 So. 2d 1095 (Fla. 1981). Sarantopoulos, 604 So. 2d at 554-55. However,
the Florida Supreme Court addressed only the conflict with West. Sarantopoulos,629 So. 2d at 121.
9. The constitutional provision provides: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures ... shall not be violated....
This right shall be construed in conformity with the 4th Amendment to the United States Constitution,
as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court." FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 12.
10. Sarantopoulos,629 So. 2d at 122-23. The court reasoned that since the petitioner's fence was
only six feet tall he could not reasonably expect privacy from heights above six feet. Id. at 623 & n.2.
11. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. By its own terms, the Constitution of the State of Florida provides
that the searches and seizures article should be construed in conformity with the Fourth Amendment to
the United States Constitution. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12. In addition, the United States Supreme Court
has held that the Fourth Amendment applies to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
12. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). The Court abandoned the trespass doctrine because it required a focus on the area viewed, while the Fourth Amendment focuses on people.
Id.
13. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
14. See id. at 356-57.
15. Id. at 348, 353. The second issue before the Court, answered in the negative, was whether
electronic surveillance of a telephone booth was exempt from advance authorization by a magistrate,
when the officers showed probable cause. Id. at 356-59.
16. Id. at 348.
17. Id. at 352.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol46/iss1/9

2

Hosely: Constitutional Law: An End to Privacy in the Curtilage
CASE COMMENTS

relied and thus constituted an unreasonable search and seizure.

8

However, it is not the majority's rationale, but the two-prong analysis
set forth in Justice Harlan's concurrence, 9 that has made the Katz decision one of the most frequently cited in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Justice Harlan stated that a person must first exhibit a subjective
"expectation of privacy" before that expectation can be violated. Objects or activities which a person exposes to the plain view of outsiders
are not protected because there is no intention to keep them private.2

Justice Harlan then stated that even if a subjective expectation of privacy
exists, a person's expectation must be one that society will recognize as
reasonable.' For example, conversations in public are not afforded pro-

tection because any expectation of privacy would be unreasonable. 4
Applying a similar test, the Katz majority reasoned that by shutting the
door and paying a toll the petitioner exhibited a subjective expectation of
privacy.' Because the booth was temporarily a private place, the
petitioner's expectations were reasonable. 26 Thus, the two-prong test allows courts to analyze the protection the Fourth Amendment affords to
individuals, not areas. Justice Harlan's articulation of the two-prong test
would be explicitly adopted later by the Court.'
Since the Katz decision, however, the Supreme Court's interpretation
of the two-prong test has continued to narrow Fourth Amendment protection.29 In California v. Ciraoo,° the Court considered whether aerial

surveillance of the curtilage3t of respondent's home was an unreasonable
18. Id. at 353.
19. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). This two-fold analysis has been fully adopted by the Supreme Court. E.g., Colorado v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735,
740 (1979).
20. See William S. McAninch, Unreasonable Expectations: The Supreme Court and the Fourth
Amendment, 20 STETSON L. REV. 435, 436-37 (1991).
21. Katz, 389 U.S. at 360-61 (Harlan, J. concurring).
22. Id. (Harlan, J., concurring). The plain view doctrine provides, "when a law enforcement officer is able to detect something by utilization of one or more of his senses while lawfully present at the
vantage point where those senses are used, that detection does not constitute a 'search' within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment." 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 2.2, at 320 (2d
ed. 1987).
"Plain view searches are to be distinguished from plain view seizures in that the latter invade
the owner's possessory interest in the item:' McAninch, supra note 20, at 436 n.9 (citing Horton v.
California, 496 U.S. 128, 133 (1990)).
23. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
24. Id. (Harlan, J., concurring).
25. Id. at 352.
26. See id.
27. See id. at 353.
28. See supra note 19.
29. See McAninch, supra note 20, at 436, 446-58.
30. 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
31. Curtilage includes "those out-buildings which are directly and intimately connected with the
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search in violation of the Fourth Amendment.3 2 Law enforcement officers
were unable to see respondent's backyard because it was enclosed by a
wooden fence.33 The officers then flew over the area and were able to
photograph marijuana plants in the respondent's yard? 4
The Supreme Court applied the Katz two-prong test35 and found no
violation of the Fourth Amendment. 6 The Court reasoned that although
respondent had a subjective expectation of privacy,37 it was not one that
society recognizes as reasonable.3" The fact that the search involved the
curtilage of the home, where privacy expectations are heightened, was
inconsequential in the Court's analysis.39 Under the plain view doctrine,
an officer is not required to shield his eyes when observations are made
from a public vantage point where he has the right to be.' Because the
officers were in public airspace where any member of the public had the
right to be, the search was reasonable."

habitation and in proximity thereto and the land or grounds surrounding the dwelling which are necessary and convenient and habitually used for family purposes and carrying on domestic employment."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 384 (6th ed. 1990).
32. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 209.
33. Id. Respondent's yard was enclosed by a six foot outer fence and a 10 foot inner fence. Id.
34. Id. The two officers' flight was at 1000 feet, which was within navigable air space. Id. The
marijuana was photographed with a standard 35mm camera. Id.
35. Id. at 211.
36. Id. at 215.
37. Id. at 211. The state did not challenge respondent's subjective expectation, but the Court did
recognize that the first prong was satisfied because the intent to maintain privacy in the backyard was
clear from the presence of fences. Id. However, the Court said it was not clear whether the
respondent's subjective expectation of privacy was to all observations of his back yard or to only those
made from a vantage point below 10 feet. Id. at 211-12.
38. Id. at 214.
39. Id. at 212. "[Tlhe curtilage is the area to which extends the intimate activity associated with
the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life." Id. at 212 (quoting Oliver v. United States,
466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984)). The Court reasoned that because the area in question was immediately
adjacent to the home and surrounded by fences it was within the curtilage. Id. at 213. The privacy
interests are heightened in the curtilage in order to protect "families and personal privacy in an area
intimately linked to the home both physically and psychologically." Id.
40. ld.; see also supra note 22 (noting that no intent to keep objects or activities private exists if
they are in plain view).
41. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 215. The Court also noled that because public airqraft travel is routine,
the respondent's expectation of privacy was even more unreasonable because he could have foreseen
the observation of his backyard from the air. Id.
In Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989), law enforcement officers hovered over respondent's
curtilage in a helicopter, observing marijuana. Id. at 448. A plurality of the Court found the respondent's expectation of privacy was unreasonable because the helicopter was flying at a legal altitude
and there was no evidence to suggest that helicopter flights were rare in respondent's area. Id. at 451.
The plurality stated that it would be a different case if the helicopter's altitude had been contrary to
law or regulation. Id. However, it was also argued that the question is not whether the officers were at
a legal vantage point but whether the vantage point was one routinely used by the public. Id. at 453. If
not, the respondent did not knowingly expose the marijuana to public view. Id. at 454-55 (O'Connor,
J.,
concurring).
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The plain view doctrine noted in Katz has been expanded to include
observations that are made on or from open fields.42 In United States v.
Dunn,43 the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether police officers
who enter private property to examine the contents of a barn have violated
the expectations of privacy guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.' In
Dunn, law enforcement officers suspected the respondent of storing controlled substances in a barn on his property. 45 A fence encircled the
respondent's residence and a separate fence surrounded the barn.46 The
officers crossed the barbed-wire fence surrounding the barn, looked inside
and observed illegal substances.47
The court concluded that the officers did not trespass on the
respondent's curtilage, 4' but only on an open field. 49 Because there is no

constitutional difference between police observations from an open field
and a public place, society is not prepared to recognize the respondent's
expectation of privacy as legitimate."0 Furthermore, the Court reasoned
that even if the barn was given Fourth Amendment protection, the search
was reasonable because the officer's observations were only from an open
field.5
In the instant case, the Florida Supreme Court adopted the application
of the two-prong test, set forth by the Fourth District Court of Appeal. 2
Under the first prong, the court appeared to agree that the petitioner made

his subjective expectation of privacy clear by enclosing his backyard with

42. See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 179-81 (1984) (holding that the open fields doctrine allows police officers to enter and search a field without a warrant--open fields are open to the
public and police in a way a home would not be; the expectation of privacy in fields is unreasonable).
43. 480 U.S. 294 (1987).
44. Id. at 296-300.
45. Id. at 296-97. Agents from the Drug Enforcement Agency learned that the respondent had
purchased chemicals used to manufacture illegal drugs. Id. Aerial photographs showed the
respondent's truck, which they knew transported the chemicals, backed up to the barn behind his
house. Id. at 297.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 297-98. The officers passed through two barbed wire fences and a wooden fence. Id.
The officers observed a phenylacetone laboratory from outside the barn, but at no time entered the
barn. Id. at 298.
48. Id. at 301.
49. See id. at 303-04. The Court used a four-factor test to come to this conclusion:
[T]he proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home, whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home, the nature of the uses to which the area
is put, and the steps taken by the resident to protect the area from observation by people
passing by.
Id. at 301.
50. See id. at 304.
51. Id.
52. Sarantopoulos, 629 So. 2d at 122-23.
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a solid six foot fence.53 However, under the second prong, the court relied on the Fourth District's citation of Ciraolo in finding that the six foot
fence created a zone of privacy only for those who could not see over the
fence. 4
Additionally, the instant court rejected the petitioner's contention that
because the officers were trespassers, they viewed the property from an
illegal vantage point and thus violated the Fourth Amendment." The
court reasoned that this conclusion was supported by Dunn.56 As in
Dunn, the officers were trespassers on private land, and at no time entered
an area protected by a heightened expectation of privacy. However, the
instant court did note that Dunn was distinguishable in that it turned on
the open field doctrine.5" Notwithstanding this difference, the instant
court reasoned that the petitioner had no constitutionally protected expectation of privacy because the officers observed the marijuana plants in
plain view and trespassed only on adjoining land.59
Two separate dissenting justices reasoned that the majority's decision
was not supported by prior caselaw. 6 First, it was contended that an
anonymous tip should not give police officers the right to use extraordinary means to look into a person's backyard.61 Second, as the majority
noted, the instant case is distinguishable from Dunn and therefore not solidly based on precedent, according to the dissent.6"
In its analysis, the instant court appropriately turned to the Katz twoprong test,63 but applied it in a questionable manner. In relying on the
lower court's rationale, the instant court failed to properly address all of
the implications of the opinions which formed the basis for that rationale.
For example, the instant court relied on Ciraolo in concluding that the
petitioner could not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area
above the six foot fence.' However, the Ciraolo decision turned on the
fact that the officers observed the curtilage from a routinely used public
thoroughfare-the airways.65 Because the officers in Ciraolo observed the
marijuana from a legally recognizable public access point, any expectation

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id.
Id. at 122.
Id. at 123.
Id. (comparing the instant facts to those in Dunn, 480 U.S. at 297-98).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 124 (Barkett, C.J., dissenting); id. (Kogan, J., dissenting).
Id. (Barkett, C.J., dissenting).
Id. (Kogan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 122.
Id.
Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213.
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of privacy was unreasonable.' Thus, it was the foreseeability of
respondent's marijuana plants being observed from this vantage point that
made expectations of privacy unreasonable.'
Conversely, the police officers in the instant case were civil trespassers
and were therefore not at a legally recognized public access point. 8 Also,
because there was no evidence that petitioner's neighbor customarily permitted trespassers to violate his curtilage, the officers were not at a routinely used public thoroughfare.' Accordingly, the petitioner had no reason to foresee his marijuana plants being observed from this vantage point
by a trespasser. As the evidence indicates, the petitioner did reasonably
foresee his neighbor looking into his backyard and properly guarded his
expectation of privacy against this hazard by erecting a fence.70
However, the instant court reasoned that the civil trespassing did not
make the police officers' observations an unreasonable search under the
open fields doctrine as applied in Dunn.7 In Dunn, the police officers'
observations were allowed because, although trespassers, their vantage
point was from an open field which is no different than observing from a
public place." The instant court also found it compelling that the Dunn
majority rejected the argument to extend Fourth Amendment protection to
a trespass occurring on private land.73
As the dissent points out, Dunn is clearly distinguishable from the
instant case.74 Even the majority noted that Dunn turned on the open
fields doctrine." The Dunn Court found that Fourth Amendment
protections were not violated because the officers remained in the open
field and never entered an area where expectations of privacy were heightened.76 In the instant case, the officers were trespassing, not in an open
field, but in the curtilage of the neighbor's house.7 It is difficult to infer
from the majority opinion in Dunn that observing as a trespasser from the

66. Id. at 213-14.
67. See id.; supra note 41.
68. See Sarantopoulos,629 So. 2d at 122; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 329 (1965) (defining a trespasser as one who enters and remains on land without privilege). The police officers were
not acting under any privilege. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 191-211 (1965) (defining
available privileges).
69. Sarantopoulos, 629 So. 2d at 121-24; Sarantopoulos, 604 So. 2d at 552-56.
70. See Sarantopoulos,629 So. 2d at 122-23.
71. Id. at 123.
72. Dunn, 480 U.S. at 304.
73. Sarantopoulos, 629 So. 2d at 123.
74. Id. at 124 (Kogan, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 123. For a brief discussion of the open fields doctrine, see supranote 42 and accompanying text.
76. Dunn, 480 U.S. at 304.
77. See Sarantopoulos,604 So. 2d at 552.
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curtilage of adjoining property is somehow analogous to observing from
an open field. Thus, the instant court has expanded the plain view doctrine
to recognize not only observations from legal, public vantage points78 and
open fields,79 but also from illegal vantage points seldom used by the
public. In doing so, the instant court has eroded Fourth Amendment
protections beyond any case which it cites as controlling."
Furthermore, the instant court failed to note that the officers had many
alternatives that were within Fourth Amendment boundaries. They simply
could have knocked on the neighbor's door and asked for permission to
enter his property.8' They could have flown over the property within navigable airspace.12 This latter alternative is compelling because a United
States Supreme Court case out of Florida recently reaffirmed the reasonableness of such a search." Yet, the officers chose to trespass in the
neighbor's yard instead of acting in accordance with established Fourth
Amendment guidelines.
When considering that modem Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has
developed only in the twenty-seven years since the Katz decision,' it is
no surprise that each opinion demonstrates the judiciary's struggle to interpret what privacy expectations society will recognize as reasonable. The
most recent decisions rest on a bare majority85 or even a plurality supported by a less-than-definite concurrence.86 However, these close decisions have succeeded in eroding the Katz ideal that a person's expectation
of privacy will be recognized as long as society recognizes such an expectation as reasonable. The outcome of this test should not turn on
what a person is growing in his backyard, but what a law abiding citizen
should expect from the Fourth Amendment. Will society recognize privacy
in a curtilage only if the curtilage is fully protected from any possibility of
view by the public? The instant Court appears to answer this question in

78. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
79. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
80. Compare Sarantopoulos, 629 So. 2d at 123 (upholding a search where the officers trespassed
on a neighbor's yard) with Dunn, 480 U.S. at 304 (holding officers never violated respondent's Fourth
Amendment rights where they trespassed, but never entered, the curtilage of his house and then peered
into a barn on the property); Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213-15 (holding that aerial observation from a lawfully operated aircraft does not violate reasonable expectations of privacy under the Fourth Amendment); and Katz, 389 U.S. at 352 (extending Fourth Amendment protection to private conversations at
a public phone booth).
81. See I LAFAVE, supra note 22, § 2.3(g), at 417-18.
82. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
83. See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 451 (1989) (plurality opinion).
84. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring); supra notes 19-24 and accompanying text.
85. See, e.g., Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 208.
86. See Rile), 488 U.S. at 447 (plurality opinion); id. at 452-55 (O'Connor, J.. concurring).
87. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 360-61 (Harlan, J., concurring); supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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the affirmative.88 Thus, what is the point of recognizing privacy in the
curtilage if the only way it is protected is when it is covered, losing its use
as a yard? In narrowing Fourth Amendment protections beyond any prior
case, the Florida Supreme Court has informed society that it cannot recognize any expectation of privacy in the curtilage as reasonable.

88. See I LAFAVF, supra note 22, § 2.3(g), at 417-18 (discussing instances where police were
permitted to enter a neighbor's property before spying on a defendant in conformity with the Fourth
Amendment).
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